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POLYGRAPH AND DECEPTION TESTS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the first of a two-part article on the polygraph, 
psychological stress evaluator, and truth serum. 
POLYGRAPH TESTING 
The Theory 
The polygraph technique is based upon two 
premises. First, psychological stress caused by the 
fear of detection will be manifested by involuntary 
physiological responses, and second, a polygraph ex-
aminer, based on these responses, can detect decep-
tion. A recent study explained the theory as follows: 
The basic theory of polygraph testing is only partially 
developed. The testing process is complex and not 
amenable to easy understanding. The most commonly 
accepted theory at present is that, when the person be-
ing examined fears detection, that fear produces a 
measurable physiolpgical reaction when the person 
responds deceptively. Thus, in this theory, the polygraph 
instrument is measuring the fear of detection rather than 
deception per se. And the examiner infers deception 
when the physiological response to questions about the 
crime or unauthorized activity is greater than the re-
sponse to other questions. U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Scientific validity of Polygraph 
Testing: A Review and Evaluation - A Technical Memo-
randum, OTA.:rM-H-15 (1983) [hereinafter cited as OTA 
Report], reprinted in 12 Polygraph 196, 201 (1983). 
The physiological responses used in polygraph 
testing are changes in blooa pressure-pulse, respira-
tion, and galvanic skin resistance. The polygraph 
machine simultaneously and continuously measures 
and records these physiological reactions on a graph 
or chart (polygram). Blood pressure-pulse is measured 
by a sphygmomanonmeter (blood pressure cuff) that is 
placed on the subject's arm; respiration is measured 
by pneumograph tubes that are fastened around the 
subject's abdomen and chest; and galvanic skin re-
sponse is measured by electrodes that are attached to 
the subject's fingertips. Some machines are also 
equipped to record muscular activity. These tracings 
may reveal efforts to "beat" the machine and in some 
cases provide independent deception criteria. J. Reid 
& F. lnbau, Truth and Deception 262 (2d ed. 1977). 
There seems little dispute that a quality polygraph 
machine can accurately measure and record these 
responses. See State v. Dean, 103 Wis.2d 228, 235, 
307 N.W.2d 628, 632 (1981) ("A quality machine accu-
rately measures and records these body responses."). 
The machine, however, detects neither deception nor 
the fear of detection; it provides only a recording of 
physiological responses. It is the examiner who, based 
on these recordings, infers deception. Critics argue 
that the physiological responses caused by the fear of 
detection have not been shown to be different from 
physiological responses caused by other emotions: 
[T]here is no reason to believe that lying produces 
distinctive physiological changes that characterize it and 
only it ... [T]here is no set of responses - physiological 
or otherwise - that humans emit only when lying or that 
they produce only when telling the truth ... No doubt 
when we tell a lie many of us experience an inner tur-
moil, but we experience a similar turmoil when we are 
falsely accused of a crime, when we are anxious about 
having to defend ourselves against accusations, when we 
are questioned about sensitive topics - and, for that 
matter, when we are elated or otherwise emotionally stir-
red. Kleinmuntz & Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detec-
tion, 17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 85, 87 (1982). 
See a/so D. Lykken, A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and 
Abuses of the Lie Detector ch.4 (1981); Lykken, The 
Lie Detector and the Law, 8 Criminal Defense 19, 21 
(May-June 1981) ("But people do not all react in the 
same way when they are lying and, more important, 
any reaction that you might display when answering 
deceptively you might also display another time, when 
you are being truthful."). 
Moreover, even if one of the underlying premises of 
polygraph testing - fear of detection causes physio-
logical reactions - were accepted, the proposition 
that the examiner can consistently detect deception by 
means of the polygraph technique need not be ac-
cepted. The examiner's role is critical because it is the 
examiner who decides whether there is sufficient in-
dication of deception: 
[T]he polygraph is not simply a machine or instrument 
that signals whether a person is being truthful or decep-
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tive. The instrument cannot itself detect deception. A 
polygraph test is very complex and depends heavily on 
the interaction between the examiner and the individual 
being tested, and requires that the examiner infer decep-
tion or truthfulness based on a comparison of the per-
son's physiological responses to various questions. The 
quality of the questions asked depends in part on what 
information the examiner already has about the person 
being questioned. OTA Report, supra, reprinted in 12 
Polygraph at 196 (statement of John Gibbons, Director of 
Office of Technology Assessment). 
Even the proponents of the polygraph technique agree 
that the examiner, and not the machine, is the crucial 
factor in arriving at reliable results. J. Reid & F. lnbau, 
supra, at 5 ("[T]he most important factor involved in 
the use of any such instrument is the ability, experi-
ence, education, and integrity of the examiner him-
self."). The examiner's expertise is critical in (1) deter-
mining the suitability of the subject for testing, (2) for-
mulating proper test questions, (3) establishing the 
necessary rapport with the subject, (4) detecting at-
tempts to mask or create chart reactions or other 
countermeasures, (5) stimulating the subject to react, 
and (6) interpreting the charts. This expertise takes on 
added significance because of the number of un-
qualified examiners holding themselves out as experts. 
/d. at 304. 
The Procedure 
The polygraph technique involves several steps, the 
most important of which are the pre-test interview and 
the examination of the subject while attached to the 
machine. In addition, a post-test interview is consid-
ered important by some authorities. /d. at 4. Unlike the 
pre-test interview and the examination itself, the ex-
aminer need not remain objective in the post-test inter-
view. Indeed, its principal .function is usually to elicit a 
confession from those subjects considered deceptive. 
The pre-test interview serves a variety of important 
functions. First, it is used to acquaint the subject with 
the effectiveness of the technique; this will allay the 
apprehensions of the truthful subject and stimulate the 
deceptive subject's concern about the prospect of de-
tection. /d. at 13-14. Second, the pre-test interview is 
used to assess the suitability of the subject for testing. 
The examiner may be alerted to some condition, such 
as a physical ailment, low intelligence, or the use of 
medication, that may affect the test results. /d. at 
233-47. Third, test questions are formulated with the 
subject's assistance during the interview. 
Although there are several different examination 
techniques, the most common technique is the control 
question technique (CQT). Questions are formulated to 
elicit either a yes or no response. There are no sur-
prise questions; the examiner reviews the questions 
with the subject during the pre-test interview to ensure 
that the subject understands them. Several different 
types of questions are used in the COT. Irrelevant 
questions are used to obtain a subject's normal 
truthful reactions and chart tracings. Examples of ir-
relevant questions are: "Is your name [subject's 
name]?" "Are you over 21 years of age?" Relevant 
questions concern the subject matter under investiga-
tion. For example: "Did you take $100 from your 
employer's safe?" Finally, control questions are used 
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in the examination. Control questions concern "an act 
of wrongdoing of the same general nature as the main 
incident under investigation, and one to which the sub-
ject, in all probability, will lie or to which his answer 
will be of dubious validity in his own mind." /d. at 28. 
See also Raskin, Science, Competence, and Polygraph 
Techniques, 8 Criminal Defense 11, 13 (May-June 1981) 
("[T]he control question deals with similar subject mat-
ter, is very general in nature, covers a long span of 
time and a large number of possible acts, and it is 
almost impossible for most people to answer it with an 
unequivocal 'no' and with certainty that they are being 
completely truthful.") For this reason, control questions 
are sometimes called "probable lie" questions. An ex-
ample would be: "Did you ever steal anything in your 
life?" Control questions are designed as a stimulus for 
the truthful subject. 
Generally, the truthful person will respond more to 
the control questions than to the relevant questions 
because they represent a greater threat to him. For 
the same reason the deceptive person will respond 
more to the relevant questions than to the control 
questions. Therefore, the subject's comparative 
responses to the control and relevant questions· are 
the key in the COT. J. Reid & F. lnbau, supra, at 63; 
Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the 
Detection of Deception, in Legal Admissibility of the 
Polygraph 94, 96 (N. Ansley ed. 1975). 
Most examiners use a global evaluation rather than 
a numerical scoring system to determine deception. 
Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra, at 89. A number of ex-
aminers, however, use quantitative scoring systems. 
See Backster, Total Chart Minutes Concept, 11 Law & 
Order 77 (1963); Raskin & Hare, Psychopathy and 
Detection of Deception in a Prison Population, 15 Psy-
chophysiology 126 (1978). In addition, in some tech-
niques the final decision on whether the subject is be-
ing deceptive is often based, in part, on factors other 
than chart interpretation. For example, the examiner's 
clinical impressions of the subject during the pre-test 
interview and examination play a role in the final de-
termination of deception. Critics contend that such a 
judgment is "a highly subjective and hence specula-
tive interpretation about the meaning of a complex 
series of verbal, behavioral and physiological re-
sponses." Kleinmuntz, The Polygraph as Credible Court 
Evidence, The Champion 14, 16 (Sept.-Oct. 1984). See 
also D. Lykken, supra, ch. 6. 
The examination typically consists of ten to twelve 
questions. The first one or two questions are irrelevant 
questions. Other irrelevant questions as well as the 
relevant and control questions are interspersed in the 
remaining questions. While the subject knows the 
questions, he does not know the order in which they 
will be asked. The examination lasts only a few min-
utes and is repeated at least one more time; often two 
or three more examinations are conducted. After the 
first examination, a stimulation test, usually a card 
test, is administered. J. Reid & F. lnbau, supra, at 42 
& 85. In the card test, the subject is asked to select a 
card from a deck. The examiner then goes through all 
the cards, one at a time, asking if each was the one 
selected. The subject is instructed to answer "no" 
~_--,_. 
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each time, even when the selected card is shown. The 
examiner, supposedly based on the polygraph tech-
nique, then identifies the selected card. Often the 
identification is not made through the polygraph tech-
nique but because the cards are marked. The purpose 
of the test is to impress the subject with the efficacy 
of the technique. 
Validity 
The validity and reliability of polygraph testing re-
mains controversial. The question is extremely com-
plex. Orne, Thackray & Paskewitz, On the Detection of 
Deception, in Handbook of Psychophysiology 743, 751 
0JV. Greenfield & R. Steimback, eds. 1972) ("No fully 
satisfactory way is available at this time for evaluating 
the overall effectiveness of the technique, and it is 
probabl_e that no such answer will be forthcoming in 
the near future from real life situations."). Prior to 1970 
very little scientific experimentation had been con-
ducted. Raskin, supra, at 13. See also Department of 
Defense, The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing 
(1984), reprinted in 13 Polygraph 1, 58 (1984) ("There 
has been more scientific research conducted on lie 
detection in the last six years than in the previous 60 
years."). 
Moreover, caution must be exercised before relying 
on the error rates frequently quoted in court decisions 
and in the literature. The figures used by field ex-
aminers are especially suspect because they are often 
based on the assumption that polygraph results are 
correct unless proven otherwise. In many instances no 
systematic follow-up studies have been conducted to 
verify the examiner's conclusions, verification criteria 
are not specified, and improper procedures are used 
to compute the error rate. Orne, supra, at 103-104; 
Validity Panel, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 
155 (N. Ansley ed. 1975) (statement of Gordon 
Barland). Favorable results from laboratory experi-
mentation, on the other hand, cannot automatically be 
assumed to apply in real life situations. There are im-
portant differences between the laboratory and foren-
sic environments that may undermine the validity of 
these experiments. The principal difference is that fear 
of detection is not as strong for experimental subjects. 
Lykken, supra, at 23 ("Since the emotional impact of 
such artificial simulations, as well as the importance to 
the individual of the outcome, is inevitably very dif-
ferent than in real life situations, such laboratory 
assessments provide no valid basis for estimating the 
accuracy of the lie test in the field."). 
A number of authorities have questioned the validity 
of polygraph testing. See D. Lykken, A Tremor in the 
Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector (1981); 
Kleinmuntz & Szucko, A Field Study of the Fallibility of 
Polygraphic Lie Detection, 308 Nature 449 (1984) (the 
validity of polygraphic interrogation has yet to be 
established). Other authorities support its validity. See 
J. Reid & F. lnbau, supra, at 304; D. Raskin, G. 
Barland & J. Podlesny, Validity and Reliability of 
Detection of Deception (June 1978). In the fall of 1983, 
the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Con-
gress submitted a report in which it reviewed and 
evaluated the research on polygraph validity. The 
report includes the following passage as part of its 
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findings: 
OTA found meaningful scientific evidence of polygraph 
validity only in the area of criminal investigations. How-
ever, even here, there is a wide divergence in the results 
of the relevant research. Six prior research reviews show-
ed average validity ranging from a low of 64 percent to a 
high of 98 percent. OTA's own review of 28 studies meet-
ing minimum acceptable scientific criteria found that, for 
example, correct guilty detections ranged from 17 to 100 
percent. Overall, the cumulative research evidence sug-
gests that when used in criminal investigations, the poly-
graph test detects deception better than chance, but with 
significant error rates. OTA Report, supra, reprinted at 12 
Polygraph 198, 200 (1983). 
Other authorities summarized the research as follows: 
[W]hen the control-question test normally used in the field 
is administered by police polygraph examiners and 
scored by inspection, rather than quantitatively, it appears 
to identify correctly about 75% of deceptive subjects, but 
at the expense of classifying 49% of truthful subjects as 
deceptive (Horvath 1977); the chance level of accuracy 
would be 50%. Similarly, a study by Barland and Raskin 
(1973) of field polygraph tests in criminal investigations 
found that 98% of the deceptive subjects were correctly 
identified, but 55% of the innocent subjects were errone-
ously identified as deceptive. Waid & Orne, The Physio-
logical Detection of Deception, 70 American Scientist 402, 
404 (1982). 
For other articles and reports on the validity issue, see 
Department of the Defense, The Accuracy and Utility 
of Polygraph Testing, supra; Abrams, Polygraph Validity 
and Reliability: A Review, 18 J. Forensic Sci. 313 
(1973); Ansley, A Compendium on Polygraph Validity, 12 
Polygraph 53 (1983); Horvath, Detection of Deception: 
A Review of Field and Laboratory Research, 5 
Polygraph 107 (1976). 
Even the proponents of polygraph testing admit that 
"when errors do occur, they tend to be more of the 
false positive than the false negative type." Raskin, 
supra, at 15. In other words, it is more likely that an in-
nocent person will be erroneously identified as decep-
tive than it is that a guilty person will be erroneously 
identified as nondeceptive. 
Other problems associated with the validity of poly-
graph testing include efforts to "beat" the test. Again, 
the research on this issue appears inadequate: "The 
research on countermeasures has been limited and 
the results conflicting." OTA Report, supra, reprinted in 
12 Polygraph at 201. For example, a recent study re-
ported that a common tranquilizer, meprobamate, 
reduces the examiner's ability to detect deceptive sub-
jects and that the examiners were unable to identify 
subjects that had used this drug. Waid, Orne, Cook & 
Orne, Meprobamate Reduces Accuracy of Physiological 
Detection of Deception, 212 Science 71 (1981). 
ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH RESULTS 
The admissibility of polygraph evidence was first 
considered and rejected in Frye v. United States, 293 
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in which the D.C. Circuit 
established the general acceptance test for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. According to the 
court, the polygraph had not gained general accep-
tance in the fields of psychology and physiology. /d. at-
1014. See generally Skolnick, Scientific Theory and 
Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 
Yale L.J. 694 (1961). From Frye until the 1970s poly-
graph evidence was overwhelmingly rejected by the 
courts. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 54, 3 N.Y.S.2d 
348, 351 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty., 1938), is an exception 
to the general rule of exclusion. That case, however, 
was soon undercut by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 
206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938), which reaffirmed the N.Y. 
Court of Appeals' earlier position excluding the results 
of polygraph examinations. 
In the early 1970s several trial courts rejected nearly 
fifty years of precedent and admitted the results of un-
stipulated polygraph examinations. In United States v. 
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), a federal 
district court found that "the theory of the polygraph is 
sound" and "directly relevant" to the issue (perjury) 
before the court. /d. at 95. The court went on to hold 
that the results of a polygraph examination conducted 
by a court-appointed expert would be admissible 
under certain conditions. /d. at 99. Polygraph results 
were also admitted in United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. 
Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(per curiam). The Zeiger court held that the "poly-
graph has been accepted by authorities in the field as 
being capable of producing highly probative evidence 
in a court of law when properly used by competent, 
experienced examiners." /d. at 690. In addition, in Peo-
ple v. Cutter, 12 Grim. L. Rptr. 2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Nov. 6, 1972), a California court admitted polygraph 
evidence during a suppression hearing after finding 
that the "polygraph now enjoys general acceptance 
among authorities, including p_sychologists and resear-
chers ... as well as polygraph examiners ... " /d. at 
2134. In addition, several other courts reached the 
same result at this time. See United States v. Hart, 
344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); State v. Watson, 115 
N.J. Super. 213, 218, 278 A.2d 543, 546 (Hudson Cty. 
Ct. 1971) (sentencing); Walter v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 
2d 316, 317, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (Queens Civ. Ct. 
1972) (civil case); In re Stenzel, 71 Misc. 2d 719, 336 
N.Y.S.2d 839 (Niagara Cty. Fam. Ct. 1972) (civil case). 
In United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1391 
(S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973), the court indicated that 
polygraph results would have been admitted lf the 
court had not been bound by precedent. 
The trend in favor of admissibility which these cases 
seemed to forecast never completely developed. 
Zeiger was reversed per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972), while Ridling and Cutter were never appeal-
ed, thus precluding the opportunity for appellate ap-
proval. Nevertheless, the courts' approach to poly-
graph evidence was altered by these decisions and 
the attention that they received in the literature. See 
generally Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 
1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-
Plagued System, 26 Hastings L.J. 917 (1975); Note, 
The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1120 (1973); Note, Pinocchio's New Nose, 48 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 339 (1973). 
Generally, the recent cases can be divided into 
three groups. The first group consists of those courts 
that adhere to the traditional position, holding poly-
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graph evidence per se inadmissible. A second group 
of courts admits polygraph evidence upon stipulation. 
Finally, several courts have held that the admissibility 
of polygraph evidence rests within the discretion of the 
trial court. 
Per Se Exclusion 
A majority of jurisdictions follow the traditional rule, 
holding polygraph evidence inadmissible per se. 
United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815, 817 (1oth Cir. 
1982); United States v. Clark, 598 F.2d 994, 995 (5th 
Cir. 1979, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981); Pulakis v. 
State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); People v. 
Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 358 (Colo. 1981); State v. An-
tone, 615 P.2d 101, 109 (Hawaii 1980); People v. 
Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 244, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 
(1981); State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975, 981 (La. 
1979); Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217, 
219 (1980); State v. Mitchell, 402 A.2d 479, 482 (Me. 
1979); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 359, 255 
N.W. 2d 171, 173 (1977); State v. Michaeloff, 324 
NW.2d 926, 927 (Minn. 1982); Pennington v. State, 437 
So. 2d 37, 40 (Miss. 1983); State v. Beachman, 616 
P.2d 337, 339 (Mont. 1980); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 
182, 185 (Mo. 1980); State v. Steinmark, 195 Neb. 545, 
548, 239 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1976); State v. French, 119 
N.H. 500, 503, 403 A.2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 954 (1979); State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 645, 300 
S.E.2d 351, 361 (1983); State v. Olmstead, 261 N.W.2d 
880, 886 (N.D.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); Bird-
song v. State, 649 P.2d 786, 788 (Okla. Grim. App. 
1982); Commonwealth v. Brockington, 500 Pa. 216, 
220, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (1983); State v. Copeland, 278 
S.C. 572, 582, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 1802 (1983); State v. Watson, 248 N.W.2d 
398, 399 (S.D. 1976); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206, 
213 (Tex. Grim. App. 1973); Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 
Va. 233, 237, 105 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1958); State v. 
Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va. 1979); State v. 
Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 
(1981). 
This exclusionary rule extends to evidence that a 
person was willing to take, took, or refused to take an 
examination. See generally Annoi., 15 A.L.R.4th 824 
(1982); Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 227 (1978). 
Some courts have relied upon the Frye general ac-
ceptance test as the basis for exclusion. See Kelley v. 
State, 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217, 219 (1980); 
People v. Barber, 400 Mich. 352, 377, 255 N.W.2d 171, 
181 (1977). The courts that have adhered to the Frye 
standard have divided over the interpretation of that 
standard. According to Frye, psychology and physio-
logy are the fields in which general acceptance must 
be achieved. 293 F. at 1014. Several decisions have 
expanded the "field" to include polygraph examiners. 
United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C.), 
rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. 
DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 
470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
907 (1973); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 
511 (D. Md. 1973). Such an approach is significant in-
asmuch as general acceptance is almost assured if 
the opinions of examiners are considered relevant. In 
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 
1975), however, the Eighth Circuit rejected this view: 
"Experts in neurology, psychiatry and physiology may 
offer needed enlightenment upon the basic premises 
of polygraphy. Polygraphists often lack extensive train-
ing in these specialized sciences." /d. at 164 n.6. ~· Other cdurts have rejected Frye as the appropriate 
standard for determining the admissiblity of scientific 
evidence and have nevertheless also excluded poly-
graph evidence. E.g., State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 
975, 979 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 759 
(Or. 1984). The principal argument against admissibil-
ity is lack of reliability. United States v. Alexander, 526 
F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e are still unable to 
conclude that there is sufficient scientific acceptability 
and Jeliability to warrant the admission of the results 
of such tests in evidence."); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 
2d 225, 239, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (1982) ("The pri-
mary obstacle in admission of polygraph evidence, 
stipulated to or not, has continually and consistently 
been the instrument's disputed scientific reliability."); 
accord Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 
1970); State v. Briddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Mo. 
1980); Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 237, 105 
S.E.2d 152, 155 (1958); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 
43-44 (W. Va. 1979). 
Several points are made on this score. First, there is 
concern that polygraph testing lacks empirical valida-
tion. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 
514 (D. Md. 1973) ("incipient stage of experimental 
research"); People v. Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87, 96, 
390 N.E.2d 562, 568 (1979) ("[T]he estimate of the 
degree of accuracy of polygraph tests seem[s] to 
~ come from polygraph examiners themselves."); People 
;;~· v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 394-95, 255 N.W.2d 171, 
189 (1977) ("[W]e find there is difficulty in empirically 
verifying polygraphic findings, ... some questions 
concerning the accuracy figures, ... and an apparent 
lack of a rational scientific explanation for this 
phenomenon."). 
Second, numerous uncontrollable factors are involv-
ed in the examination. See People v. Anderson, 637 
P.2d 354, 359 (Colo. 1981) ("Several uncontrollable or 
unascertainable physiological and psychological re-
sponses may cause difficulty or error .... "); Peopl'e v. 
Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 236, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 
(1981) ("abnormal blood pressure, heart and respira-
tory irregularities, fatigue, intoxication, rationalization, 
extreme nervousness, meditative abstraction, controll-
ed breathing, instrument discomfort, uncomfortable 
room temperature, obesity, hidden muscular contrac-
tions, self-inflicted pain, mental incompetence, psycho-
pathy or schizophrenia, ingestion of a sedative, an at-
tempt to suppress a cough, fear induced by suspicion 
or accusation, or lack of fear of detection."). 
Third, the subjective nature of the deception deter-
mination is problematic. People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 
354, 360 (Cqlo. 1981) (The polygraph technique, "albeit 
based on a scientific theory, remains an art with unu-
sual responsibility placed on the examiner."); People v. 
"AA!" Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87, 98, 390 N.E.2d 562, 569 :~ {1979) ("almost total subjectiveness surrounding the 
use of the polygraph and the interpretation of the 
results"); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 48 (W. Va. 
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1979) ("subjective analysis"). 
Fourth, the absence of adequate standards for as-
sessing the qualifications of examiners is an additional 
concern. See People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 360 
(Colo. 1981) ("[T]he absence of adequate qualification 
standards for the polygraph profession heighten[s] the · 
possibility for grave abuse .... "); State v. Catanese, 
368 So. 2d 975, 982 (La. 1979) (lack of judicial and 
legislative control of competence of examiners). 
Even if the reliability of the technique is established, 
additional problems are cited as reasons for exclusion 
- for example, the danger that an opinion concerning 
the truthfulness of a witness will intrude too much· into 
the jury's historic function of assessing credibility, Peo-
ple v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 244, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 
1079 (1981) ("A potential trial by polygraph is an un-
warranted intrusion into the jury function."); State v. 
Davis, 407 So. 2d 702, 706 (La. 1981) ("usurps the 
jury's prerogative on a question involving credibility"); 
the danger that the jury will overvalue the expert's 
testimony, United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 
168 (8th Cir. 1975) ("When polygraph evidence is of-
fered ... it is likely to be shrouded with an aura of 
near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi."); 
State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 1979) 
("trier of fact is apt to give almost conclusive weight to 
the polygraph expert's opinion"); and the possibility 
that the trial will degenerate into a time consuming 
trial of the polygraph technique. People v. Barbara, 
400 Mich. 352, 410, 255 N.W.2d 171, 196 {1977) ("pos-
sibility of bogging down trials with collateral matters, 
perhaps resulting in a trial of the polygraph, or a bat-
tle of experts"); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 275, 
307 N.W.2d 628, 651 (1981) ("a trial of the polygraph 
and the polygraph operator rather than a trial of the 
defendant's guilt"). 
Whether juries will be overawed by polygraph evi-
dence is a matter of dispute. See generally Cavoukian 
& Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence 
in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 Law & Human 
Behavior 117 (1980); Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo, The 
Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury Deliberations: 
An Empirical Study, 5 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 148 (1977); 
Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence 
on Mock Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 
324 (1979). 
Admissibilty Upon Stipulation 
A substantial minority of states admit polygraph 
evidence upon stipulation of the parties. See generally 
Katz, Dilemmas of Polygraph Stipulations, 14 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 285 (1984); Note, Admissibility of Poly-
graph Data When Both Parties Have Stipulated That It 
Will Be Admissible, 13 Land & Water L. Rev. 613 
(1978); Note, Admissibility of Polygraph Test Results 
Upon Stipulation of the Parties, 30 Mercer L. Rev. 357 
(1978); Casenote, Stipulation Cannot Make Polygraph 
Results Admissible: State v. Biddle, 47 Mo. L. Rev. 586 
(1982). 
For the most part, admissibility by stipulation has 
been achieved by court decision. United States v. 
Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 973 (1976); Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 
299-301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Montes, 136 
Ariz. 491, 667 P.2d 191, 199 (1983); State v. Valdez, 91 
Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962); Holcomb v. State, 
268 Ark. 138, 139, 594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); Williams 
v. State, 378 A.2d 117, 120 (Del. 1977); State v. Fuller, 
387 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980); State v. 
·Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77, 239 S.E.2d 324, 325 
(1977); Pavone v. State, 273 Ind. 162, 164-66, 402 
N.E.2d 976, 978-79 (1980); State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 
570, 586-87 (Iowa 1980); State v. Roach, 223 Kan. 723, 
735, 576 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1978); Corbett v. State, 584 
P.2d 704, 707 (Nev. 1978); State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 
36, 297 A.2d 849, 854-55 (1972); State v. Souel, 53 
Ohio St. 2d 123, 133-34, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323-24 
(1978); State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265, 1268-69 
(Utah 1984); State v. Renfro, 96 Wash.2d 902, 905, 
639 P.2d 737, 739, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982); 
Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 457 (Wyo. 1977). 
Statutory provisions may accomplish the same 
result. Cal. Evidence Code § 351.1 (West Supp. 1984) 
provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of 
a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to 
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examina-
tion, shall not be admitted into evidence in any crimi-
nal proceeding ... unless all parties stipulate to the 
admission of such results." 
At one time the trend toward admissibility by stipu-
lation appeared so strong that it seemed only a matter 
of time before it became the majority rule. Recent de-
cisions, however, cast doubt on this possibility. Indeed, 
several courts that initally permitted the admissibility 
of polygraph evidence upon stipulation have overruled 
their earlier decisions, holding polygraph evidence per 
se inadmissible. State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 645, 300 
S.E.2d 351, 356-61 (1983), overruling State v. Milano, 
297 N.C. 485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1979); Fulton v. State, 
541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Grim. App. 1975), overruling 
Castleberry v. State, 522 P.2d 257 (Okla. Grim. App. 
1974), and Jones v. State, 527 P.2d 169 (Okla. Grim. 
App. 1974); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 
N.W.2d 628, 653 (1981), overruling State v. Stanislaw-
ski,_ 6? Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974). 
Courts rejecting the admissibility of stipulated ex-
aminations argue that the stipulation does nothing to 
enhance the reliability of polygraph evidence, which 
is the principal reason for exclusion. See Pulakis v. 
State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); State v. Grier, 
307 N.C. 628, 642, 300 S.E.2d 351, 359 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Brockington, 500 Pa. 216, 220, 455 A.2d 
627, 629 (1983); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206, 213 
(Tex. Grim. App. 1973); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 
268-69 307 N.W.2d 628, 648 (1981). Other arguments 
against the stipulation approach are that a stipulation 
that makes unreliable evidence admissible is contrary 
to public policy and is an invalid stipulation of law. 
People v. Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87, 88, 390 N.E.2d 
562, 563 (1979). 
According to some courts the answer to these ob-
jections is that admissibility does not derive "from the 
fact that the stipulation somehow imbues the evidence 
with reliability ... but from the fact that the parties are 
estopped, by their stipulated waiver of the right to ob-
ject, from asserting the unacceptability of the evi-
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dence .... " Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 299 (Ala. 
Grim. App. 1982); accord State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 
570, 586-87 (Iowa 1980) (estoppel); State v. Rebater-
ana, 681 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1984) (estoppal). Other 
courts that accept polygraph results upon stipulation 
recognize, at least implicitly, that the technique pos-
sesses some degree of validity - at least when ad-
mitted under controlled conditions designed to ensure 
that the examination is properly administered by a 
competent examiner and to limit the purpose of ad-
missibility. E.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 
736 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1477 (1976) 
("We believe the necessary foundation can be con-
structed through testimony showing a sufficient degree 
of acceptance of the science of polygraphy by experi-
enced practitioners in polygraphy and other related ex-
perts."); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 
894, 900 (1962) (polygraphy "has been developed to a 
state in which its results are probative enough to war-
rant admissibility upon stipulation"); Corbett v. State, 
584 P.2d 704, 707 (Nev. 1978); State v. McDavitt, 62 
N.J. 36, 46, 297 A.2d 849, 854-55 (1972). 
The theory recognized for admission of stipulated 
results may be critical. The waiver or estoppel theory 
could permit the prosecution to introduce polygraph 
results in its case-in-chief unless the stipulation limits 
admissibility to impeachment. In contrast, courts per-
mitting admission of stipulated results under controlled 
conditions typically limit admissibility to credibility, with 
the result that the evidence is admissible only if the 
defendant takes the stand. 
The leading case on admissibility by stipulation is 
State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), in 
which the Arizona Supreme Court held that stipulated 
polygraph results are admissible if the following condi-
tions are met: 
(1) That the county attorney, defendant and his counsel 
all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's sub-
mission to the test and for the subsequent admission at 
trial of the graphs and the examiner's opinion thereon on 
behalf of either defendant or the state. 
(2) That notwithstanding the stipulation the admissibility 
of the test results is subject to the discretion of the trial 
judge, i.e. if the trial judge is not convinced that the ex-
aminer is qualified or that the test was conducted under 
proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence. 
(3) That if the graphs and examiner's opinion are of-
fered in evidence the opposing party shall have the right 
to cross-examine the examiner respecting: 
a. the examiner's qualifications and training; 
b. the conditions under which the test was 
administered; 
c. the limitations of and possibilities for error in the 
technique of polygraph interrogation; and 
d. at the discretion of the trial judge, any other 
matter deemed pertinent to the inquiry. 
(4) That if such evidence is admitted the trial judge 
should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony 
does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the 
crime with which a defendant is charged but at most 
tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination 
defendant was not telling the truth. Further, the jury mem-
bers should be instructed that it is for them to determine 
what corroborative weight and effect such testimony 
should be given. /d. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01. 
